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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Petitioner Elanith Valansi seeks judicial review of a final 
order of removal entered by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (the "BIA" or "Board") for the United States 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS" or 
"Government"). The Board ruled that the petitioner's 
conviction for embezzling, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S 656, in 
excess of $400,000 in cash and checks from her employer 
(the First Union National Bank) was an aggravated felony 
as defined in section 101(a)(43)(M)(i) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (the "INA" or "Act") (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). It therefore 
ordered her removed to Israel pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Valansi's petition asks us to vacate the 
Board's final order of removal because her conviction under 
18 U.S.C. S 656 does not qualify as an aggravated felony 
authorizing her removal from the United States. For the 
reasons explained below, we grant the petition for review 
and vacate the Board's order. 
 
I. Background Facts and Procedural History  
 
Valansi was born in Israel in 1974. She first came to the 
United States with her parents and older sister only a 
month and a half after her birth, and has been a lawful 
permanent resident in this country since 1990. Valansi's 
family settled in Monmouth County, New Jersey, where she 
attended elementary and high school and received her high 
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school diploma. She later attended a local community 
college. Her father, mother, and sister are all lawful 
permanent residents. Her sister's son is a United States 
citizen, and she has two siblings from her father's prior 
marriage who are both United States citizens. 
 
From 1992 to 1995, Valansi was employed as a bank 
teller in Tinton Falls, New Jersey. From 1995 to 1997, she 
was a bank teller with First Union National Bank ("First 
Union") in Eatontown, New Jersey. Prior to 1997, she had 
never been arrested and had no criminal record. However, 
on six separate occasions spanning four months in 1997, 
Valansi embezzled in the aggregate more than $400,000 in 
cash and checks entrusted to First Union. A federal grand 
jury returned an indictment charging that, "with intent to 
injure and defraud the Bank, [Valansi] knowingly and 
willfully embezzle[d] and purloine[d] . . . moneys, funds, 
credits, and assets belonging to the Bank and intrusted 
[sic] to her custody and care," in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 656. 
 
On October 30, 1998, Valansi pled guilty to the six-count 
indictment in exchange for the Government's agreement not 
to prosecute her further for any charges that might arise 
from her embezzlement, and in exchange for a stipulation 
regarding the federal sentencing guidelines that would 
apply to her case. During the plea colloquy during which 
Valansi's plea was accepted by the Court, the Government 
set forth the following essential elements of the crime to 
which she agreed to plead guilty: 
 
       First, that at the time of the offense charged, Valansi 
       was an employee of First Union National Bank, which 
       is a national bank. 
 
       Second, that she wilfully embezzled money or credits of 
       First Union, or money, funds or assets entrusted to the 
       custody or care of First Union. 
 
       Third, that the value of those moneys or assets was in 
       excess of $1,000. 
 
       And, lastly, that Valansi acted with the intent to"injure 
       or defraud" the bank. 
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The Court asked Valansi a series of questions designed to 
determine whether her criminal conduct conformed to the 
elements of the offense. It confirmed that she was an 
employee of First Union and that she "deliberately" removed 
funds in the amounts charged within the indictment with 
the intent to "deprive" the bank of those funds. The Court 
concluded that her conduct violated the elements of the 
offense under 18 U.S.C. S 656 and accepted Valansi's guilty 
plea. On January 22, 1999, Valansi was sentenced under 
United States Sentencing Guideline S 2B1.1, the Sentencing 
Guideline for theft offenses, to six months imprisonment 
followed by five years supervised release, the first six 
months of which to be served at home under electronic 
monitoring. She was ordered to pay restitution in the 
amount of $32,260.22 for the cash amounts embezzled. 3 
 
Valansi served her prison term. She sought employment 
in the prison education department and was hired to teach 
basic literacy and American Sign Language. In January 
1999, Valansi became engaged to marry a United States 
citizen, and the couple planned a May 1999 wedding. On 
April 24, 1999, the INS served Valansi with a notice to 
appear for a removal proceeding charging her with removal 
for committing an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Valansi was taken into INS custody 
almost immediately after being released from prison. 4 She 
was later released in May 2000 to complete the house 
arrest portion of her sentence. 
 
On December 7, 1999, an Immigration Judge held that 
Valansi was removable under 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as 
an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony. 
On July 20, 2000, the BIA affirmed. In doing so it rejected 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The restitution amount does not reflect the amounts embezzled 
through checks because the checks could not be negotiated without 
proper endorsements and were recovered when the thefts were 
discovered. 
 
4. Valansi's brief describes inconsiderate treatment from INS agents 
when attending her father's funeral while in their custody. Although we 
believe that conduct was serious, and that it may have caused 
unnecessary emotional distress to Valansi, we do not repeat it at length 
here because it does not bear on our analysis of whether her conviction 
qualifies as an aggravated felony. 
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Valansi's argument that her conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 656 was not an aggravated felony because it was a theft 
offense with a term of imprisonment of less than one year. 
It concluded that Valansi's conviction under S 656 was 
properly considered an aggravated felony because it was an 
offense involving fraud or deceit (and not theft) that 
resulted in loss to the victim greater than $10,000. 
 
Valansi filed this petition for review on August 7, 2000. 
The Government moved to dismiss her petition on 
September 11, 2000, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
and Valansi filed an opposition to this motion on October 2, 
2000. By order dated November 1, 2000, our Court referred 
this motion to a merits panel.5 By letter dated October 20, 
2000, Valansi's attorney notified this Court that she would 
become eligible for removal on November 7, 2000, but that 
he had not received notice from the INS expressing an 
intent to execute the removal order at that time. To 
preserve the status quo and allow us to make a decision on 




Valansi's petition for review is governed by 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(a)(2)(C), which provides that "no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an 
alien who is removable by reason of having committed a 
criminal offense covered in section . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)." We 
have recently explained that this jurisdiction-stripping 
provision comes into play only when two facts exist:"(1) the 
petitioner is an alien (2) who is deportable by reason of 
having been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses." 
Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001). In 
keeping with the views of several other circuit courts, we 
held that we have jurisdiction "to determine whether these 
jurisdictional facts are present." Id.; Tapia Garcia v. INS, 
237 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001); Mahadeo v. Reno, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. On October 12, 2000, Valansi moved for summary reversal of the 
BIA's decision and for a stay of removal. The Government filed a 
response on November 13, 2000, and Valansi submitted a reply on 
November 29, 2000. This motion was also referred to the merits panel on 
January 3, 2001. 
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226 F.3d 3, 9 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2590 
(2001); Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 784 (2001); Santos v. Reno, 228 F.3d 
591, 597 n.11 (5th Cir. 2000); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 
212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. INS, 194 
F.3d 539, 542 (4th Cir. 1999); Diakite v. INS , 179 F.3d 553, 
554 (7th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 
In this case, Valansi does not dispute that she is an 
alien. Instead she argues that her conviction for 
embezzlement of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. S 656 does 
not qualify as an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and that she therefore cannot be 
deported pursuant to 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). If she is 
right, judicial review is not precluded, and the removal 
order will be vacated for failing to allege a removable 
offense. If she is wrong, 8 U.S.C. S 1252(a)(2)(C) deprives us 
of jurisdiction to inquire any further into the merits, and 
the removal order will stand. Because we are determining a 
purely legal question, and one that governs our own 
jurisdiction, we review de novo whether the petitioner's 
conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony. See, e.g., 
Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788, 791 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 121 S. Ct. 757 (2001) ("Reviewing the matter de 
novo, we nevertheless conclude that we have no jurisdiction 
under IIRIRA [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996], because Lopez-Elias was 
convicted of a crime of violence . . . ."); Solorzano-Patlan v. 
INS, 207 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[B]oth our 
jurisdiction to hear this case and the merits of the appeal 
turn on the question of whether Solorzano-Patlan is an 
aggravated felon, a decision we review de novo."); Ye v. INS, 
214 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) ("This court reviews de 
novo the question of whether a particular offense 
constitutes an aggravated felony for which an alien is 
subject to removal."). 
 
Despite our exercise of de novo review, we will give 
deference to the agency's interpretation of the aggravated 
felony definition if Congress's intent is unclear."We do not 
doubt that the principles of Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . apply in general 
to the statutory scheme set out in the INA." Drakes, 240 
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F.3d at 250 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 
424-25 (1999)). The Aguirre-Aguirre Court explained that 
"the BIA should be accorded Chevron deference as it gives 
ambiguous statutory terms `concrete meaning through a 
process of case-by-case adjudication.' " 526 U.S. at 425. 
The courts of appeals have likewise employed Chevron 
when interpreting immigration statutes that ultimately 
determined their jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bell, 218 F.3d at 90 
(analyzing under Chevron standard whether the 
Immigration Act of 1990 superseded the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1988 date restriction with regard to aggravated 
felonies); Lettman v. Reno, 207 F.3d 1368, 1370 (11th Cir. 
2000) (same); Lewis, 194 F.3d at 544 (same); Maghsoudi v. 
INS, 181 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (according"due 
deference" to the BIA's interpretation of whether a crime 
involved "moral turpitude" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)); Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 
1323-24 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Chevron when deciding 
whether a conviction for solicitation under Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
S 13-1002 is a deportable offense within the meaning of 8 
U.S.C. S 1251(a)(2)). But see Lopez-Elias , 209 F.3d at 791 
("Even assuming the ambiguity of the statutory terms of 
IIRIRA, however, the fact that courts defer to the INS's 
construction of its statutory powers of deportation does not 
mean that similar deference is warranted with respect to 
the enforcement of this court's jurisdictional limitations."). 
 
Under Chevron, "[w]e only defer . . . to agency 
interpretations of statutes that, applying the normal `tools 
of statutory construction,' are ambiguous." INS v. St. Cyr, 
121 S. Ct. 2271, 2290 n.45 (2001) (quoting INS v. Cardoza- 
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987)). In St. Cyr, the 
Supreme Court refused to defer to the BIA's interpretation 
of whether certain provisions of IIRIRA should be applied 
retroactively because "there is, for Chevron  purposes, no 
ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve." Id. 
Prior to St. Cyr, courts of appeals agreed that deference to 
the BIA's interpretation of the Act is only appropriate when 
Congress's intent is unclear. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Reno, 
166 F.3d 225, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Assuming arguendo that 
Chevron does apply, it directs us to ascertain, by `employing 
traditional tools of statutory construction,' whether 
Congress has expressed `an intention on the precise 
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question at issue.' ") (quoting Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843 n.9); 
Bell, 218 F.3d at 90 ("If, by employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction, we determine that Congress's intent 
is clear, that is the end of the matter. However, if the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue, we then ask whether the agency's answer is based on 
a permissible construction of the statute.") (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted); Lewis , 194 F.3d at 
544 ("If we conclude that Congress has not directly 
addressed the question at issue in a statute or its intent is 
ambiguous, we must defer to the Board's interpretation of 
the statute provided it is not an unreasonable one.") 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, our 
task is to determine, using ordinary tools of statutory 
construction, whether Congress intended the definition of 
aggravated felony provided in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) to 
include embezzlement of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. 
S 656. 
 
"The first step in interpreting a statute is to determine 
`whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute 
in the case.' " Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 U.S. 337, 
340 (1997)). When the statutory language has a clear 
meaning, we need not look further. Id.; see also In re 
Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9 (BIA 2001) (examining first the 
"terms of the statute itself " before turning to "traditional 
tools of statutory construction, such as the legislative 
history" to determine Congressional intent). 
 
"The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is 
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific 
context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole." Marshak , 240 F.3d at 
192 (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the 
specific provision providing a definition of aggravated 
felony, 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), does not mention 
embezzlement. It provides that an aggravated felony 
includes "an offense that -- involves fraud or deceit in 
which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." Id. 
Valansi does not dispute that her conviction satisfies the 
$10,000 monetary requirement. Instead, she argues that 
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her conviction for embezzlement is not an offense that 
"involves fraud or deceit." 
 
The BIA argues to the contrary. It has acknowledged that, 
because the term "fraud" is not defined in the INA, "it 
should be used in the commonly accepted legal sense, that 
is, as consisting of false representations of a material fact 
made with knowledge of [their] falsity and with intent to 
deceive the other party. The representation must be 
believed and acted upon by the party deceived to his 
disadvantage." Matter of GG, 7 I&N Dec. 161, 164 (BIA 
1956); see also Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 
1508 (3d Cir. 1992) ("Under general principles of tort law, 
the elements of fraud are: (1) a material factual 
misrepresentation; (2) made with knowledge or belief of its 
falsity; (3) with the intention that the other party rely 
thereon; (4) resulting in justifiable reliance to that party to 
his detriment.") (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts 
SS 525-526 (1977)); Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 
1999) (defining fraud as "a knowing misrepresentation of 
the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce 
another to act to his or her detriment" and explaining that 
"[f]raud is usu. a tort, but in some cases (esp. when the 
conduct is willful) it may be a crime."). 
 
The term "deceit" also is not defined in the INA. However, 
it is commonly perceived as "[t]he act of intentionally giving 
a false impression," Black's Law Dictionary 413 (7th ed. 
1999), or "the act or process of deceiving," which is in turn 
defined as "to cause to believe the false." Webster's Third 
New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged 584 (3d ed. 1993). 
 
Turning back to 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), we 
determine whether the phrase "offense that -- involves 
fraud or deceit" has a plain meaning. The word"involves" 
means "to have within or as part of itself " or "to require as 
a necessary accompaniment." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary at 1191. Thus, an offense that 
"involves fraud or deceit" is most naturally interpreted as 
an offense that includes fraud or deceit as a necessary 
component or element. It does not require, however, that 
the elements of the offense be coextensive with the crime of 
fraud. 
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An examination of the surrounding sections providing 
further examples of aggravated felonies supports this 
reading of the phrase "involves fraud or deceit." In 
S 1101(a)(43)(A) Congress defined the term aggravated 
felony to mean "murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor." 
In that case, it may have intended only those specific 
crimes, and not other offenses "involving" those crimes, to 
qualify as aggravated felonies. In S 1101(a)(43)(F) Congress 
defined an aggravated felony to mean "a crime of violence 
(as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a 
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year." It thus limited the scope of the 
provision to apply only to crimes specified in a certain 
section within the United States Code. By analogy, had 
Congress intended S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) to cover only 
convictions for the crime of fraud, it could have stated that 
an aggravated felony includes "the offense of fraud" or "the 
offense of fraud as defined in [a specific provision for the 
crime of fraud]." Thus, the use of the word"involves" 
expands the scope of S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) to include offenses 
that have, at least as one element, fraud or deceit. 
 
Using this framework, we examine whether a conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. S 656 qualifies as a crime"involving fraud 
or deceit." The statute provides that 
 
       [w]hoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee 
       of, or connected in any capacity with any . . . national 
       bank . . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully 
       misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such 
       bank . . . shall be [subject to fines provided in the 
       statute . . .]. 
 
Id. The Government is required to establish five elements to 
obtain a conviction under this provision: (1) the defendant 
was an employee, (2) of a federally connected bank, (3) who 
took cash or other assets, (4) in the custody or care of the 
bank, (5) with the intent to injure or defraud the bank. See, 
e.g., United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 1024 (3d 
Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Schmidt, 471 F.2d 385 
(3d Cir. 1972)). 
 
The predecessor of 18 U.S.C. S 656 explicitly enunciated 
the last element, the intention to injure or defraud the 
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bank, but the 1948 revision omitted this language. 
Nevertheless, Golden v. United States, 318 F.2d 357 (1st 
Cir. 1963), and Seals v. United States, 221 F.2d 243 (8th 
Cir. 1955), held that this revision did not change the 
meaning or substance of the existing law. In Schmidt we 
cited Golden and Seals for the proposition that an intent to 
injure or defraud, "while no longer explicitly required by the 
statute, is still considered an essential element of the 
crime." 471 F.2d at 386. Because the element is stated in 
the disjunctive, it may be shown either by intent to injure 
or intent to defraud. As Judge Posner wrote in United 
States v. Angelos, "Moreover, it is important to distinguish 
between intent to injure and intent to defraud; either will 
do, and they are not the same." 763 F.2d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
 
No doubt the crime of "embezzlement with intent to 
defraud" would qualify as an offense "involving fraud or 
deceit." The common meaning of the term "defraud" is "to 
take or withhold from (one) some possession, right, or 
interest by calculated misstatement or perversion of truth, 
trickery, or other deception." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary at 593. 
 
However, the mens rea element under S 656 may also be 
established by proof of an "intent to injure." The plain 
meaning of the term "injure" is "to do an injustice to," "to 
harm, impair or tarnish the standing of," or"to inflict 
material damage or loss on." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary at 1164. Acting with the intent to 
injure does not require "false representations of a material 
fact made with knowledge of [their] falsity and with intent 
to deceive the other party," Matter of GG, 7 I&N Dec. at 
164, or "a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or 
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to 
his or her detriment." Black's Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 
1999). Nor does it require deception, which is defined as 
causing another to believe what is false. Thus, a conviction 
under S 656 establishing only that the defendant acted with 
an intent to injure his or her employer is not an offense 
that "involves fraud or deceit" under 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
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The INS maintains that a conviction for embezzlement 
under S 656 includes as a necessary element a finding that 
Valansi had the specific intent to defraud or deceive her 
employer. In its view, Valansi necessarily admitted that she 
committed a crime with intent to defraud her employer 
when she pled guilty.6 
 
We disagree. The cases establish that a conviction may 
be established under 18 U.S.C. S 656 by proving that the 
defendant acted with either an intent to injure or an intent 
to defraud. See United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 104 
(3d Cir. 1979); Schoenhut, 576 F.2d at 1024; Schmidt, 471 
F.2d at 386; United States v. Moraites, 456 F.2d 435, 441 
n.9 (3d Cir. 1972)). The Government's isolated citation to 
United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1174 (3d Cir. 
1979), does not persuade us that a conviction under the 
statute necessarily requires an intent to defraud. Although 
Thomas listed as a basic element of the crime that "the 
defendant must have acted with intent to defraud the 
bank," it cited to Schoenhut, which, as noted above, held 
that a conviction may be obtained by proving either an 
intent to injure or an intent to defraud. We do not believe 
that Thomas intended to change the landscape of the law. 
 
Consequently, some but not all convictions under 18 
U.S.C. S 656 qualify as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). A conviction establishing that the 
defendant acted with the intent to defraud his or her 
employer qualifies as an offense that involves fraud or 
deceit, and therefore as an aggravated felony. A conviction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Our dissenting colleague agrees, citing Gov't of the V.I. v. Moolenaar, 
133 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 1998), for the proposition that embezzlement 
"necessarily" involves deception. In that case we held an information to 
be sufficient even though it used the term "theft" rather than the 
statutory term "larceny." The thrust of our analysis was that the word 
"theft" may be taken to mean "breaking and entering," in contrast with 
"[f]raud and embezzlement," which "necessarily involve securing 
possession of another's property by deception." Id. This brief 
characterization of the crimes of "fraud and embezzlement" does not 
outweigh case law establishing that intent to injure alone may suffice for 
guilt under 18 U.S.C. S 656, particularly when linking "embezzlement 
and fraud" renders ambiguous whether "embezzlement" taken alone 
necessarily involves deception. 
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establishing that the defendant acted only with an intent to 
injure his or her employer does not.7 
 
Taking a position directly opposite the Government's, 
Valansi argues that Congress intended convictions under 
18 U.S.C. S 656 to qualify as aggravated felonies only when 
they meet the requirements of S 1101(a)(43)(G) rather than 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Section 1101(a)(43)(G) defines an 
aggravated felony as "a theft offense (including receipt of 
stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of 
imprisonment [is] at least one year." Because Valansi's 
conviction resulted in a term of imprisonment of less than 
one year, she maintains that it should not be considered an 
aggravated felony. 
 
Valansi's argument relies upon background law with 
which Congress may be presumed to be familiar. See 
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979); 
Matter of Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I&N Dec. 957, 964 n.3 (BIA 
1995) (Congress is "presumed to be cognizant of existing 
law pertinent to the legislation it enacts."). She directs our 
attention principally to three sources of law to assist in 
determining Congress's intent -- the federal criminal 




7. In this respect, our conclusion is different from that of the Eleventh 
Circuit. In Moore v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2001), that Court 
acknowledged that "to establish the offense of misapplication of bank 
funds under 18 U.S.C. S 656, the government must prove as an element 
of the offense that the accused `acted with intent to injure or defraud 
the 
bank.' " Id. at 923. It then observed that "the `intent to injure or 
defraud' 
element of the offense is established by proof that the defendant 
knowingly participated in a deceptive or fraudulent transaction." Id. It 
therefore concluded that "the crime of misapplication of bank funds 
under 18 U.S.C. S 656 necessarily involves fraud or deceit and is 
appropriately considered an aggravated felony under INA 
S 101(a)(43)(M)(i), 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)." Id. We agree that the 
Government may establish that the accused acted with"intent to injure 
or defraud" by offering proof that he or she"knowingly participated in a 
deceptive or fraudulent transaction." However, we also believe that 
element could be satisfied by proof that the defendant acted with merely 
an intent to injure his or her employer. Under the latter circumstance, 
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 656 does not, in our view, necessarily 
involve fraud. That depends on how the conviction under S 656 unfolds. 
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Valansi points out that, under federal criminal statutes, 
embezzlement of bank funds is an offense under 18 U.S.C. 
S 656, whereas bank fraud is a separate offense under 18 
U.S.C. S 1344. Moreover, embezzlement underS 656 is 
grouped together with theft offenses in Chapter 31 of Title 
18, whereas fraud offenses are grouped in Chapters 47 and 
63 of that Title. She also directs our attention to precedent 
stating that the term "theft" was intended to encompass all 
forms of stealing, including embezzlement, under the 
federal criminal statutes. See United States v. Turley, 352 
U.S. 407, 412-13 & n.8, 415 n.14 (1957); United States v. 
Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880-81 (3d Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Maloney, 607 F.2d 222, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Henry, 447 F.2d 283, 285 (3d Cir. 1971). 
She argues that we may presume that Congress was aware 
of these classifications and likewise intended that 
embezzlement be treated as a theft offense for purposes of 
the aggravated felony definition rather than an offense 
involving fraud or deceit. 
 
Valansi also urges us to take notice of the distinction 
between theft offenses and fraud offenses in the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines Manual. U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1 creates a 
distinct Guideline for theft offenses, including 
embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. S 656, whereas U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1 creates a separate Sentencing Guideline for fraud 
and deceit offenses that does not include embezzlement 
under S 656. She urges us to compare the commentary to 
U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1, identifying that Guideline's applicability 
to convictions under 18 U.S.C. S 656, with the commentary 
to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, which does not list 18 U.S.C. S 656 
among the convictions to which that Guideline applies. 
Consistent with this distinction, Valansi was sentenced 
under U.S.S.G. S 2B1.1, the Guideline for theft offenses, not 
fraud offenses. She argues that because the definition of 
aggravated felony under S 1101(a)(43) adopted the same 
categories of offenses that are found in the Guidelines, a 
conviction for embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. S 656 should 
be treated as a theft offense under S 1101(a)(43)(G) rather 
than an offense involving fraud and deceit under 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). 
 
Finally, Valansi argues that the treatment of 
embezzlement as a theft rather than fraud offense in the 
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Model Penal Code constitutes background law that we can 
presume Congress intended to parallel. She directs our 
attention to the fact that the Model Penal Code consolidates 
all stealing offenses, including embezzlement, under"theft," 
and places theft offenses in a section separate from fraud 
offenses. Compare Model Penal Code S 223 with S 224. 
 
We do not dispute that courts may look to these sources 
when attempting to divine Congress's intent when passing 
the INA. Indeed, the BIA appears to have done so on several 
occasions when interpreting whether various criminal 
convictions may be classified as aggravated felonies in 
S 1101(a)(43). See, e.g., In re Espinoza, Int. Dec. 3402, 1999 
WL 378088 (BIA 1999) (en banc) (examining classifications 
under federal statutes and Sentencing Guidelines when 
determining whether misprision of felony constitutes an 
offense relating to the obstruction of justice under 
S 1101(a)(43)(S)); In re Perez, Int. Dec. 3432, 2000 WL 
726849 (BIA 2000) (en banc) (relying on Model Penal Code 
definition of burglary when determining whether breaking 
into a vehicle qualifies as an aggravated felony under the 
INA); In re VZS, Int. Dec. 3434, 2000 WL 1058931 (BIA 
2000) (holding that a conviction under Model Penal Code 
S 223.2, which includes embezzlement, constitutes a theft 
offense under S 1101(a)(43)(G));8  In re Bahta, Int. Dec. 3437, 
2000 WL 1470462 (BIA 2000) (relying on Model Penal Code 
definition of theft offense when determining whether 
conviction for attempted possession of stolen property was 
an attempted theft offense under S 1101(a)(43)(G)). 
 
However, Valansi's argument suffers from a defect similar 
to that of the INS: it classifies convictions under 18 U.S.C. 
S 656 in an all-or-nothing manner. Valansi urges us to 
conclude that every conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 656 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Valansi maintains that In re VZS is binding precedent that required 
the BIA to classify her conviction as a theft offense rather than an 
offense involving fraud or deceit. We disagree. The fact that the BIA 
classified embezzlement as defined in the Model Penal Code as a theft 
offense under S 1101(a)(43)(G) does not mean that it could not also 
classify it as an offense involving fraud or deceit under 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Moreover, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 656 may be 
different from embezzlement under the Model Penal Code if the former 
includes an element of fraud or deceit that the latter does not. 
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should be treated as a theft offense for purposes of the 
aggravated felony definition because in other areas of the 
law Congress has chosen to align embezzlement offenses 
more closely with the crime of theft than with the crime of 
fraud. However, as we have explained above, the scope of 
the aggravated felony definition in S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) is not 
coextensive with the crime of fraud. Congress's placement 
of the crime of embezzlement in the same Title of the 
United States Code as theft offenses, and treatment of 
sentencing for embezzlement offenses like sentencing for 
theft offenses, does not compel us to conclude that 
Congress intended to exclude the possibility of fraud within 
a conviction for embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. S 656. An 
analysis of the plain meaning of the statute suggests that 
embezzlement with intent to defraud would qualify as an 
offense that "involves fraud or deceit." When the statutory 
language has a clear meaning, we need not look further. 
Marshak, 240 F.3d at 192.9 
 
Having determined the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), we turn our attention to Valansi's 
specific case. We have cautioned that where "a criminal 
statute on its face fits the INA's deportability classification 
. . .[,] [t]o go beyond the offense as charged and scrutinize 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We pause to address Valansi's argument that the "longstanding 
principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes 
in favor of the alien," Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 449, requires that 
her conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 656 be treated as a theft offense rather 
than an offense involving fraud or deceit. This rule of construction 
(which Valansi refers to as the "rule of lenity," a term traditionally 
reserved for the criminal, not immigration, context) may be applied as a 
canon of last resort to determine the intent of Congress on an 
ambiguous issue. See id.; Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 200 & n.6 (3d 
Cir. 1996); In re Crammond, 23 I&N Dec. 9 (BIA 2001). However, it need 
not be applied when the intent of Congress is already clear based on an 
analysis of the plain meaning of the statute. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 449; Marincas, 92 F.3d at 200. After analyzing the text of 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), we believe there is no ambiguity to resolve because 
the plain meaning of the section is evident: it includes offenses that 
have 
fraud or deceit as an element. A conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 656 
qualifies as an offense that has fraud or deceit as an element if there 
was a finding that the embezzlement was committed with an intent to 
defraud. 
 
                                16 
 
 
the underlying facts would change our inquiry from a 
jurisdictional one into a full consideration of the merits. 
Such an approach would fly in the face of the jurisdiction 
limiting language of IIRIRA." Drakes, 240 F.3d at 247-48. 
However, in this case we have determined that the criminal 
statute does not fit squarely within the INA's deportability 
classification because some, but not all, of the convictions 
under 18 U.S.C. S 656 qualify as offenses involving fraud or 
deceit. Because we are unable to determine from the face of 
the statute whether Valansi's conviction is among those 
that qualify as an aggravated felony, we must take the 
additional step of examining the underlying facts to 
determine whether Valansi pled guilty to an offense 
involving fraud or deceit. 
 
A federal grand jury issued an indictment against Valansi 
charging that, "with intent to injure and defraud the Bank, 
[she] knowingly and willfully embezzle[d] and purloine[d] 
. . . moneys, funds, credits, and assets belong to the Bank 
and intrusted [sic] to her custody and care," in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 656. Although the Government urges us to 
conclude based upon the indictment that Valansi pled 
guilty to the intent to injure and defraud the bank, we 
hesitate to do so. While Valansi pled guilty to the 
indictment, her specific statements during the colloquy 
clarified what that plea entailed. "To comport with the Fifth 
Amendment, a defendant's plea of guilty must be voluntary 
and intelligent." Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 113 (3d 
Cir. 1995); accord United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 
1130 (3d Cir. 1991). The court is required to ensure that 
the defendant understands the nature of the charge before 
accepting his or her guilty plea as voluntary and intelligent. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c). We therefore decline to limit our 
inquiry to the charge as stated in the indictment. We 
instead examine the entire context of Valansi's conviction, 
including not only the offense as charged in the indictment, 
but also as explained to her and confirmed by the District 
Court during the plea colloquy. 
 
When the District Court asked the Government to read 
the elements of Valansi's crime into the record during the 
plea colloquy, the Government included as a necessary 
element that Valansi "acted with the intent to injure or 
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defraud the bank." The District Court then asked a series 
of questions with the goal of confirming that Valansi's 
conduct conformed to the elements charged. Valansi's 
responses demonstrate the intent to injure her employer by 
depriving it of its property. But never do they demonstrate 
clearly that Valansi's specific intent was to defraud the 
bank. 
 
The Court first established that Valansi was an employee 
of First Union, and that she was "responsible, along with 
others, for processing night deposit bags which had been 
left by customers in the night deposit drop at the bank." 
Valansi agreed that this was correct. The Court then asked 
whether she "removed each of the [night deposit] bags from 
the bank deliberately," and whether she took the"batch of 
checks from the bank deliberately and knowing that it was 
wrong to do so." It asked Valansi whether she"intend[ed] in 
each case to deprive the bank of the cash and checks 
contain[ed] in the bags," and whether she"intend[ed] to 
deprive the bank of the checks contained in that batch 
knowing that they had not yet been fully processed." 
Valansi answered yes to each of these questions. 
 
The Court then asked the following question: "Ms. 
Valansi, you have admitted here today that you did not 
intend to return those checks back from your apartment to 
the bank, that you intended to deprive the bank of that 
property, is that correct?" Valansi answered"No, it's not." 
The following dialogue between her counsel (Mr. Pascarella), 
the prosecutor (Mr. Weissman), the Court, and Valansi then 
ensued: 
 
        MR. PASCARELLA: There was discussion between 
       myself and Mr. Weissman with reference to the checks, 
       and the admission was that she in fact took the 
       checks, deprived the bank, sustaining a loss, they had 
       not been fully processed. 
 
        The question posed [is] whether or not she 
       deliberately took those checks in depriving the bank. I 
       don't know if Ms. Valansi is prepared to actually state 
       that up until the time she gave the statement to 
       Detective Cleary she did not intend to actually return 
       the checks, because, quite frankly, at the time of 
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       sentence your Honor will hear certain remarks by 
       myself regarding the fact that the checks were 
       valueless to her. They only signified signatures on a 
       piece of paper and they were worth maybe the amount 
       of two cents per piece of paper. 
 
        THE COURT: Let's talk about what the plea today is 
       to and what the admission was, because Question 13 
       on Schedule A, and I will refer to it, it says "Did you 
       intend to deprive the bank of the checks contained in 
       that batch, knowing that they had not been fully 
       processed?" 
 
        MR. PASCARELLA: What I think the answer to the 
       question is, at the time she actually took the checks 
       she committed a crime because she intended to deprive 
       the bank of those checks knowing that they had not 
       been fully processed. 
 
        There came a point in time when Ms. Valansi 
       recognized two things: One, they were useless to her, 
       and two, they knew they were gone and that she had 
       intended to return them. 
 
        The crime had been complete. We are not talking 
       about a crime that had not been completed at this 
       time. 
 
        If the question were posed in that fashion to Miss 
       Valansi, she would acknowledge that number 13 is 
       accurate. 
 
        Is that correct Ms. Valansi? 
 
        MS. VALANSI: Yes. 
 
        MR. WEISSMAN: I agree with that analysis. 
 
        THE COURT: What everybody is telling me is . . .[t]he 
       taking meant an intent to deprive. 
 
        MR. PASCARALLA: That's correct. 
 
        THE COURT: That's what Miss Valansi is admitting 
       to? 
 
        MR. PASCARELLA: That's correct. 
 
       BY THE COURT: 
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       Q Is that correct, Ms. Valansi? 
 
       A Yes. 
 
       Q You are saying it is, yes, I took it -- I took them, I 
       intended to deprive the bank of them, but I'm not 
       going to say that I also never intended to return 
       them. Is that fair to say? 
 
       A Correct. 
 
       Q Is there anything else that you wish to add in terms 
       of my understanding of what you're admitting to on 
       the issue of checks? 
 
       A No, ma'am. 
 
After confirming Valansi's intent to deprive the bank of 
its property, the Court abruptly switched to the general 
charges in the indictment which, as noted above, listed as 
an element of her crime the intent to "injure and defraud." 
 
       Q In terms of all of the charges in the indictment, and 
       if you wish to review them one more time before 
       you answer, or if you can answer directly, how do 
       you plead to all the charges in the indictment, 
       guilty or not guilty? 
 
       A Guilty. 
 
        THE COURT: I find that in this case that Ms. Valansi 
       is fully competent and capable of entering an informed 
       plea, that she's aware of the nature of the charges and 
       the consequences of the plea, and entering the plea of 
       guilty is knowingly and voluntarily done. I accept Ms. 
       Valansi's plea and she is now adjudged guilty of that 
       offense. 
 
When reviewing this plea colloquy, we are faced with a 
dilemma. On one hand, the plea colloquy viewed in a 
general sense contains a plea of guilt to the charges of the 
indictment, which contained the phrase "injure and 
defraud." On the other hand, the District Court and the 
Government failed to establish throughout the plea colloquy 
whether Valansi was admitting that she had acted with the 
intent to defraud her employer. The Court repeatedly asked 
whether Valansi had the intent to "deprive" the bank of the 
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checks, to which she responded affirmatively. The meaning 
of "deprive" is "to take something away from." Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary at 606; accord Black's 
Law Dictionary at 453 (defining deprivation as an"act of 
taking away."). That word connotes an injury to the bank, 
but nothing of an intent to defraud, which means"to cause 
injury or loss to (a person) by deceit," Black's Law 
Dictionary at 434, or "to take or withhold . . . by calculated 
misstatement . . . or other deception." Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary at 593. But the District Court and 
the Government failed to establish that Valansi deceived 
the bank (i.e., by causing it to believe what is false) or acted 
fraudulently (i.e., by making a knowing misrepresentation 
of the truth or concealment of a material fact to induce the 
bank to act to its detriment).10 
 
In this case, Valansi accepted guilt for theft and an intent 
to injure, but did not clearly accept guilt as to any 
fraudulent intent. Several times during the sentencing the 
Judge referred to Valansi's act as a "theft." The Court also 
stated that Valansi admitted to the specific acts that she 
committed that made her criminally responsible. In 
imposing sentence the Court referred to the money Valansi 
had taken, rather than a fraud the Government now alleges 
she had committed. 
 
In this context, we cannot conclude, after scrutinizing the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We recognize that it is common practice for United States Attorneys' 
Offices to pursue a strategy of "plead in the conjunctive, but instruct in 
the disjunctive" in order to "avoid uncertainty." Dep't of Justice 
Criminal 
Resource Manual S 227. This tactic relies on the fact that 
 
       [w]hen a statute specifies several alternative ways in which an 
       offense may be committed, the indictment may allege the several 
       ways in the conjunctive, and this fact neither renders the 
indictment 
       bad for duplicity nor precludes a conviction if only one of the 
several 
       allegations linked in the conjunctive in the indictment is proven. 
 
Id., citing United States v. McCann, 465 F.2d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 1972). 
The use of the conjunctive in the indictment is"to avoid uncertainty" 
only; just as the Government may obtain a conviction if "only one of the 
several allegations linked in the conjunctive in the indictment is 
proven," 
so may a defendant plead guilty to only one of the allegations required 
to prove an element of her crime. 
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entire plea colloquy and record, that Valansi knowingly pled 
guilty to embezzlement with the specific intent to defraud. 
We simply do not know and may not speculate (though 
indeed we are skeptical about) whether Valansi would have 
accepted that her conduct amounted to an intent to 
defraud rather than to injure her employer. This skepticism 
is fed by what we do know: Valansi, advised by experienced 
immigration counsel, wanted strongly to avoid subjecting 
herself to deportation as a result of her plea. Not conceding 
this alternative element of embezzlement allowed her both 
a way to plead affirmatively to the crime and to offer an 
argument to elude deportation. 
 
The Supreme Court has recently explained that "[p]lea 
agreements involve a quid pro quo between a criminal 
defendant and the government, . . . There is little doubt 
that . . . alien defendants considering whether to enter into 
a plea agreement are acutely aware of the immigration 
consequences of their convictions." St. Cyr , 121 S. Ct. at 
2291. The plea colloquy in this case states explicitly that 
"to the extent that there [was] any immigration or 
deportation issue, [Valansi was] apprised of the 
consequences of the plea as they may affect her status." In 
fact she retained separate counsel to advise her on the 
immigration consequences of the guilty plea. We believe 
that Valansi would have avoided pleading guilty to 
embezzlement with the specific intent to defraud and 
therefore cannot conclude that she pled guilty to"an 





The plain meaning of S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) defines an 
aggravated felony as an offense that has fraud or deceit as 
at least one required element. Some but not all convictions 
under 18 U.S.C. S 656 qualify as an aggravated felony 
under that definition: a conviction for embezzlement with 
specific intent to defraud qualifies as an offense involving 
fraud or deceit, and thus an aggravated felony; a conviction 
with only the specific intent to injure does not. 
 
In Valansi's case, the specific intent to defraud was not 
established. It appears that Valansi was counseled to avoid 
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admitting to that intent, and the plea colloquy fails to pin 
down the mens rea element sufficiently for us to conclude 
that Valansi acted with the intent to defraud rather than to 
injure her employer. The Government had ample 
opportunity during the plea colloquy to explore the fraud or 
deceit element, but made no effort to do so. In light of this 
failure to make its case, particularly in a situation where it 
must have realized that little things mean a lot, we will 
grant Valansi's petition for review and vacate the final order 
of removal for failure to establish that she was convicted of 
an aggravated felony. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
At her guilty plea to embezzlement (18 U.S.C S 656), 
Valansi's counsel engaged in a clever bit of lawyering that 
was not picked up on by the government or the District 
Judge. As a consequence, the majority holds that although 
pleading guilty to embezzlement, Valansi never pled guilty 
to a crime involving fraud or deceit. Because I believe the 
majority mistakenly defines the crime of embezzlement 




Valansi embezzled in the aggregate more than $400,000 
in cash and checks entrusted to First Union National Bank 
on six separate occasions spanning four months in 1997.1 
She pled guilty to six counts of embezzlement under 18 
U.S.C. S 656.2 As a lawful permanent resident, Valansi is 
removable if her conviction qualifies as an aggravated 
felony under 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 
The critical issue on appeal is whether a conviction for 
embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. S 656 constitutes an 
aggravated felony, defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) as 
"an offense that -- involves fraud or deceit in which the loss 
to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000." Because Valansi 
pled guilty to embezzling more than $10,000, the sole 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Valansi's indictment was based on the following criminal conduct: On 
April 30, 1997, Valansi embezzled $5,084.99 in cash and checks; on 
May 27, 1997, Valansi embezzled $11,287.86 in cash and checks; on 
June 7, 1997, Valansi embezzled $3,904.22 in cash and checks; on June 
16, 1997, Valansi embezzled $8,239.05 in cash and checks; on August 
4, 1997, Valansi embezzled $14,003.34 in cash and checks; on August 
12, 1997, Valansi embezzled $370,674.69 in cash and checks entrusted 
to the care of First Union National Bank. 
 
2. Valansi was charged with six counts of embezzlement in the 
indictment. Each count charged her with "knowingly and wilfully" 
embezzling deposits "intrusted to her custody and care." Valansi pled 
guilty to each count. 
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question is whether embezzlement is an offense that 
"involves fraud or deceit."3 
 
18 U.S.C. S 656 provides, in part: 
 
       Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee 
       of, or connected in any capacity with any . . . national 
       bank . . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully 
       misapplies any of the moneys, funds or credits of such 
       bank . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
       imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both; but if the 
       amount embezzled, abstracted, purloined or misapplied 
       does not exceed $1,000, he shall be fined under this 
       title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 
 
The statute does not define "embezzle." Therefore, we 
must resort to its settled meaning. In Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), the Supreme Court held: 
 
       [W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are 
       accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of 
       centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts 
       the cluster of ideas that were attached to each 
       borrowed word in the body of learning from which it 
       was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
       judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such 
       case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as 
       satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a 
       departure from them. 
 
Id. at 263; see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) ("[W]here words are employed 
in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning 
at common law or in the law of this country, they are 
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the 
context compels to the contrary.").4  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I agree with the majority that "the use of the word `involves' expands 
the scope of S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) to include offenses that have, at least 
as 
one element, fraud or deceit" and that the provision does not require 
"that the elements of the offense involving `fraud or deceit' be 
coextensive 
with the crime of fraud." Supra at 9. 
4. Similarly, "where Congress uses a common law term in a federal 
criminal statute, absent a new instruction defining it, Congress is 
presumed to adopt the term's widely accepted common law meaning." 
United States v. Cicco, 10 F.3d 980, 984 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
Morissette, 
342 U.S. at 263); United States v. Nedley, 255 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 
1958)). 
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The term "embezzlement" has been defined consistently 
by the Supreme Court for more than 100 years. In 1887, 
the Supreme Court said embezzlement had a "settled 
technical meaning."5 United States v. Northway, 120 U.S. 
327, 334 (1887). In 1895, the Supreme Court held 
"[e]mbezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property 
by a person to whom such property has been intrusted, or 
into whose hands it has lawfully come." Moore v. United 
States, 160 U.S. 268, 269 (1895); see also United States v. 
Petti, 459 F.2d 294, 295 (3d Cir. 1972).6 In 1902, the 
Supreme Court declared "the word `embezzled' itself implies 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the person receiving the 
money. . . . Indeed, it is impossible for a person to embezzle 
the money of another without committing a fraud upon 
him." Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189 (1902). 
 
Later cases have articulated that the act of embezzlement 
violates a relationship of trust and confidence."In 
embezzlement, breach of fiduciary duty is an inherent 
element of the crime." United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 
1304, 1310 (3d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. 
Sayklay, 542 F.2d 942, 944 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The essence 
of embezzlement lies in breach of a fiduciary relationship 
deriving from the entrustment of money."). In order to be 
convicted of embezzlement, the accused must be entrusted 
with another's money or property or have lawful possession 
by virtue of some office, employment, or position of trust 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. "By the late 18th century, courts were less willing to expand common- 
law definitions. Thus, when a bank clerk retained money given to him by 
a customer rather than depositing it in the bank, he was not guilty of 
larceny, for the bank had not been in possession of the money. Stautory 
crimes such as embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses 
. . . were created to fill this gap." Bell v. United States, 462 U.S. 356, 
359 
(1983) (citations omitted). See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law S 8.6 at 369 (1986) ("[E]mbezzlement . . . [was a] crime 
created by the legislature for the specific purpose of plugging loopholes 
left by the narrowness of the crime of larceny."). 
 
6. See Black's Law Dictionary 522 (6th ed. 1990) (Embezzlement is 
defined as "the fraudulent appropriation of property by one lawfully 
entrusted with its possession."); 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law S 8.6 at 368 (1986) (Embezzlement is defined as: "(1) the 
fraudulent (2) conversion of (3) the property (4) of another (5) by one 
who 
is already in lawful possession of it."). 
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before converting it.7 The Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit notes: 
 
       The notion of "fraudulent conversion," at the heart of 
       embezzlement, may sound obscure, but, in fact, it is 
       not. It essentially refers to, say, a bank teller, trustee, 
       or guardian using money entrusted to him by another 
       person for his own purposes or benefit and in a way 
       that he knows the "entruster" did not intend or 
       authorize. 
 




Valansi pled guilty to "knowingly and willfully" 
embezzling bank deposits. Despite the settled definition of 
"embezzlement," the majority declines to apply that 
definition to Valansi's conduct and guilty plea. Nor does it 
address her position of trust as an employee,8 or the breach 
of her fiduciary duties to the bank. As a result, I believe the 
majority misinterprets the elements of embezzlement under 




As a bank teller for First Union National Bank, Valansi 
was in a fiduciary relationship. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. "The crime of embezzlement builds on the concept of conversion, but 
adds two further elements. First the embezzled property must have been 
in the lawful possession of the defendant at the time of its 
appropriation. 
Second, embezzlement requires knowledge that the appropriation is 
contrary to the wishes of the owner of the property." United States v. 
Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 216-17 (4th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 
8. "Fraud inherently involves some exploitation of trust." United States 
v. 
Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 231 (3d. Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Koehn, 74 F.3d 199, 201 (10th Cir. 1996) ("In 
every successful fraud the defendant will have created confidence and 
trust in the victim . . . ."); United States v. Mullens, 65 F.3d 1560, 
1567 
(11th Cir. 1995) ("[T]here is a component of misplaced trust inherent in 
the concept of fraud . . . ."); United States v. Hathcoat, 30 F.3d 913, 
915 
(7th Cir. 1994) ("By its definition, embezzlement requires a finding of a 
breach of trust.")). 
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       The essence of a fiduciary relationship is that the 
       fiduciary agrees to act as his principal's alter ego. . . . 
       Hence the principal is not armed with the usual 
       wariness that one has in dealing with strangers; he 
       trusts the fiduciary to deal with him as frankly as he 
       would deal with himself--he has bought candor. 
 
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 
On six separate occasions spanning four months, Valansi 
appropriated checks and cash entrusted to her for deposit. 
Under any definition, this breach of her fiduciary duties 
involved fraud and deceit.9 By pleading guilty to 
"knowingly" embezzling the deposits "intrusted to her care," 
Valansi demonstrated the requisite intent for "fraudulent 
conversion."10 These actions were paradigmatic examples of 
embezzlement. As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
said: 
 
       An embezzler, like a thief or a swindler, may commit 
       the crime in any of a myriad of different ways. But, in 
       each instance, the embezzler will have acted for his 
       own purposes and contrary to authorization. He will 
       have "fraudulently converted" property entrusted to 
       him by another. (citations omitted). 
 
Young, 955 F.2d at 103. 
 
A crime involving fraud or deceit qualifies as an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. "Fraud in the common law sense of deceit is committed by deliberately 
misleading another by words, by acts, or, in some instances -- notably 
where there is a fiduciary relationship, which creates a duty to disclose 
all material facts -- by silence." Dial, 757 F.2d 163. 
 
10. One basic source says "the mental state required for embezzlement 
generally appears in the statutes in the form of the adverb `fraudulently' 
modifying the verb `converts.' (If the statute should instead punish one 
who `embezzles,' it would not signify anything different, for `embezzles' 
means `fraudulently converts.')" 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive 
Criminal Law S 8.6 at 379 (1986). Another source defines "fraudulent 
conversion" as "[r]eceiving into possession money or property of another 
and fraudulently withholding, converting, or applying the same to or for 
one's own use and benefit, or to [the] use and benefit of any person other 
than the one to whom the money or property belongs." Black's Law 
Dictionary 662 (6th ed. 1990). 
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aggravated felony.11 Independent of the fraud analysis, 
Valansi's conduct also constituted a crime involving deceit.12 
We have stated that "[f]raud and embezzlement necessarily 
involve securing possession of another's property by 
deception . . . ." Gov't of the V.I. v. Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 
246, 250 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
As a result, a conviction for embezzlement under 18 
U.S.C. S 656 constitutes an offense involving fraud and 
deceit and qualifies as an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). See Moore v. Ashcroft , 251 F.3d 919, 923 
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding "[t]he `intent to injure or defraud' 
element of the offense is established by proof that the 
defendant knowingly participated in a deceptive or 




The "dilemma" the majority wrestles with, whether 
Valansi embezzled more than $400,000 with the "intent to 
defraud" or the "intent to injure," is unnecessary to the 
resolution of this appeal. Knowledge satisfies the required 
mental state under S 656.13 Valansi pled guilty to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Valansi's counsel ignores the fact that offenses that "involve deceit" 
qualify as aggravated felonies. 
 
12. "Deceit" is defined as the "act or process of deceiving (as by 
falsification, concealment, or cheating)," which is in turn defined as "to 
be false, to betray . . . to deprive especially by fraud or stealth." 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 
Unabridged 584 (3d ed. 1993). 
 
13. The Third Circuit cases the majority cites (all of which involve the 
"willful misapplication of funds" under S 656 rather than embezzlement) 
favor the government's position. "It is well settled that `intent to 
injure or 
defraud a bank exists if a person acts knowingly and if the natural result 
of his conduct would be to injure or defraud the bank even though this 
may not have been his motive.' " United States v. Krepps, 605 F.2d 101, 
104 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Schmidt, 471 F.2d 385, 386 
(3d Cir. 1972)); see also United States v. Schoenhut, 576 F.2d 1010, 
1024 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Intent to injure or defraud a bank exists whenever 
the defendant acts knowingly and the result of his conduct would be to 
injure or defraud the bank, regardless of his motive."). Furthermore, 
"reckless disregard of the interests of the bank is equivalent to intent 
to 
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"knowingly and willfully" embezzling deposits"intrusted to 
her custody and care." (A-90, 104-110). Because 
"embezzlement" means to convert by fraud and deception, 
it makes no difference whether Valansi pled guilty to 
embezzlement with the "intent to injure" or the "intent to 
defraud."14 Embezzlement with the "intent to injure" still 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
injure or defraud." Krepps, 605 F.2d at 104; Schoenhut, 576 F.2d at 
1024. By pleading guilty to "knowingly and wilfully" embezzling the 
money, which showed a reckless disregard of the interests of the bank 
and had the natural result of injuring and defrauding the bank (to 
defraud "means `to cause injury or loss to (a person) by deceit' or `to 
take 
or withhold . . . . by calculated misstatement . . . or other deception.' 
" 
Supra at 21), Valansi was guilty of embezzling $400,000.00 with the 
intent to injure and defraud the bank. 
 
In discussing the mens rea requirement under S 656, we stated in 
Schoenhut, 
 
        Section 656 penalizes willful misapplication, but that term must 
       be placed in context with the other acts prohibited by the section. 
       It proscribes actions of one who "embezzles, abstracts," and 
       "purloins." When this is read together with willful misapplication, 
it 
       is evident that the mens rea for the crime is not fulfilled by mere 
       indiscretion or even foolhardiness on the part of the bank officer. 
       His conduct must amount to reckless disregard of the bank's 
       interest or outright abstraction of funds. 
 
576 F.2d at 1024. 
 
14. The majority's citation to United States v. Angelos, 763 F.2d 859 (7th 
Cir. 1985) is inapposite. That case involved the willful misapplication of 
funds rather than embezzlement. In Angelos, a bank president arranged 
a loan, without the approval of the bank's board of directors, to a 
business in which he owned 80 percent of stock. Convicted under 18 
U.S.C. S 656 for willful misapplication of funds, Angelos argued on 
appeal that because he intended to repay the loan his conduct did not 
violate S 656. 
 
The court held Angelos' argument was irrelevant not only because one 
can injure a bank "by taking its money even if you intend to return it," 
but because Angelos breached his fiduciary duty to the bank and as a 
result intended to defraud it. Id. at 861. 
 
       By lending the bank's money in effect to himself in violation of 
       accepted banking procedures, Angelos breached his fiduciary 
       obligation to the bank, and it is irrelevant whether he thought, 
and 
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constitutes an offense that involves fraud and deceit. Based 
on her guilty plea, Valansi fraudulently converted $400,000 
with the intent to injure the bank and committed an 
aggravated felony. 
 
       III. 
 
Valansi pled guilty to "knowingly and willingly" 
embezzling more than $400,000 "intrusted to her care." As 
a result, she committed a crime involving fraud and deceit; 
a crime which constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 
U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). For the foregoing reasons, I would 
affirm the judgment of the BIA. 
 
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 




       thought correctly, that the bank would not be hurt. Intent to 
       defraud -- which means, to take financial advantage of a 
       confidential relationship . . . is all that is required to make out 
a 
       violation of section 656; intent to injure the bank need not be 
       shown. 
 
Id. at 861-862 (citations omitted). 
 
Even under the Angelos analysis, Valansi intended to defraud First 
Union as she breached her fiduciary obligation to the bank and took 
financial advantage of her position of trust and confidence. The majority 
does not discuss Valansi's breach of her fiduciary duties nor does it 
define "embezzlement" or apply it to these circumstances. 
 
Because "embezzlement," unlike "willful misapplication of funds," has 
a precise definition ("the fraudulent appropriation of property. . . .") 
it is 
irrelevant whether Valansi fraudulently appropriated the deposits with 
the intent to injure or the intent to defraud the bank. Either way, she 
committed an offense involving "fraud." 
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